Short answer: Antivirus scanning at the storage level finds malicious files that are written to Qumulo: droppers, infected documents, payloads that spread through shared folders. It does not stop a compromised client from encrypting files over SMB with valid credentials, because encrypted files are not malware. Scanning is one layer. You also need endpoint protection, behaviour monitoring on the audit log, and locked snapshots to recover.
How ransomware reaches a file cluster
In most incidents, ransomware does not run on the storage system. It runs on a client: a workstation after a phishing mail, a server after a stolen password. From there it reads and rewrites files on every share the user or service account can reach. To Qumulo, these are ordinary authenticated SMB or NFS writes.
On the way, attackers often use file shares to stage tools and spread: a script in a shared folder, an infected template that colleagues open, an executable dropped in a software share.
What storage-level scanning catches
| Threat | Caught by scanning on Qumulo? | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Known malware written to a share | Yes | The file is scanned after the write and handled by your antivirus policy |
| Infected document uploaded by an unmanaged device | Yes | Scanning does not depend on the client’s protection |
| Malware staged in a share to spread to other clients | Yes, if the engine knows it | Removed or reported before many others open it |
| Malware unknown to the engine at write time | Not until the file changes again | Post-change scanning checks files when they change; a file that was unknown at write time stays unscanned until then |
| Encryption of existing files by a compromised client | No | Encrypted files contain no malicious code |
| Mass deletion or renaming | No | These are file operations, not files |
| Data theft before encryption | No | Reading files leaves nothing to scan |
The first three rows are why storage-level scanning is worth having. The last three are why it is never enough on its own.
To close the gap for malware that was unknown when it was written, you can add occasional full scans from a separate server that reads the shares with your antivirus engine. These scans walk the whole file tree and put load on the cluster, so schedule them outside working hours.
The layers that close the gaps
- Endpoint protection and EDR on every client. Stops most ransomware before it starts encrypting. Qumulo considers clients the most likely point of an outbreak.
- Least privilege on shares. A user who can only write to three shares can only encrypt three shares. Review service accounts with broad write access first.
- Behaviour monitoring. Qumulo writes audit logs of file operations and can send them via syslog to a SIEM or a specialised monitoring tool. Sudden mass renames or rewrites by one account are the pattern to alert on.
- Storage-level malware scanning. Finds malicious files regardless of which client wrote them, and gives the security team a verifiable control at the storage layer.
- Locked snapshots. Snapshots are read-only, so encryption cannot change them. Locked snapshots cannot be deleted before they expire, even by an administrator, unless a request is signed with a key held outside the cluster. This is what lets you recover.
Recovery from a second cluster or a backup is a further layer, covered in our articles on failover and backup.
What to ask of any scanning approach
- Does it scan files from unmanaged clients and applications, or only from managed endpoints?
- How long does a new file stay unscanned?
- Does it slow down file access?
- Does it use your existing antivirus engine and its management console, or add a separate one?
- Can storage and security admins verify that every change was scanned?
How yuzuy fits
yuzuy’s Anti-Virus Integration covers layer 4. It scans every created or modified file in the protected paths within seconds, on Windows scan servers running yuzuy Protection Clients and your own antivirus engine. Client access is never blocked. Detections, quarantine and alerts appear in your antivirus console with your existing policies.
yuzuy is deliberately not more than that. It does no inline (on-access) scanning, no behaviour analysis, and no EDR. It adds no detection logic of its own; detection comes from the antivirus engine you choose. That keeps it simple to run and lets it sit next to the tools you already use for the other layers.
Anti-Virus Integration · Does Qumulo support ICAP? Antivirus scanning options for Qumulo
FAQ
Can antivirus scanning on the NAS stop ransomware encryption? No. Encryption happens on the compromised client and produces encrypted files, which contain no malware. Endpoint protection and behaviour monitoring address encryption; snapshots let you recover.
Are Qumulo snapshots safe from ransomware? Snapshots are read-only, so clients cannot encrypt them. Snapshot locking also protects them against deletion by a compromised administrator account.
Do I still need storage-level scanning if all clients run EDR? If every system that writes to Qumulo is managed and protected, the gap is small. In practice, unmanaged devices, appliances and application servers often write to shares, and many security policies require a control at the storage layer.
Sources
- Qumulo Security Architecture and Practices (Qumulo, PDF)
- Watching for file and directory changes by using REST (Qumulo)
